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FMC Corp. v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 942 F.3d 916  
(9th Cir. 2019) 
 
Seth T. Bonilla 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 1998, FMC Corporation (“FMC”) agreed to submit to the Sho-
shone-Bannock Tribes’ (“Tribes”) permitting processes, including the 
payment of fees, for clean-up work required as part of consent decree ne-
gotiations with the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).1 Then, in 
2002, FMC refused to pay the Tribes under a permitting agreement entered 
into by both parties, even though the company continued to store hazard-
ous waste on land within the Shoshone-Bannock Fort Hall Reservation in 
Idaho (“Reservation”).2 FMC challenged the Tribes’ authority to enforce 
the $1.5 million permitting fees first in tribal court and later challenged the 
Tribes’ authority to exercise civil regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction 
over the non-Indian corporation in federal court.3 FMC Corp. v. Shoshone-
Bannock Tribes demonstrates the complexities and fraught nature of tribal 
civil jurisdiction. 
 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
 FMC opened an elemental phosphorus plant on fee land within the 
Reservation in 1949.4 This plant produced twenty-two million tons of haz-
ardous waste, including arsenic and “radioactive materials that emit 
gamma radiation,” which FMC stored on the Reservation.5 After declaring 
FMC’s plant a Superfund site under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response Compensation, and Liabilities Act (“CERCLA”), 6  the EPA 
charged FMC with violating the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(“RCRA”)7.8 To avoid litigation, FMC negotiated the terms of a consent 
decree with the EPA.9 The consent decree included a provision requiring 
FMC to apply for all necessary clean-up permits from the Tribes.10  
 
1. FMC Corp. v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
161387, at *8 (D. Idaho 2017) [hereinafter FMC Corp. I]. 
2. FMC Corp. v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 942 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 
2019) [hereinafter FMC Corp II]. 
3. FMC Corp. I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *3. 
4. Id. at *5. 
5. Id. 
6.  42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2018). 
7.  42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k. 
8.  FMC Corp. I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *5. 
9. Id. at *5–6. 
10. Id. at *6. 
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Faced with high permitting fees, FMC negotiated an agreement 
with the Tribes where the company agreed to tribal jurisdiction in ex-
change for reduced fees.11 Under this accord, FMC agreed to pay the 
Tribes $2.5 million on June 1, 1998, and $1.5 million annually to continue 
storing the waste on the Reservation.12 Within months of resolving the per-
mitting issue, FMC and the EPA completed negotiations and established 
the consent decree.13 Under the terms of the consent decree, the EPA re-
quired FMC to pay $11.9 million in fines, cap the plant’s waste ponds, and 
comply with tribal permitting.14 The consent decree further required FMC 
to pay a $1.5 million annual fee as part of its compliance with tribal per-
mitting.15 
 FMC paid $2.5 million on June 1, 1998,16 and paid “the annual 
use permit fee from 1998 to 2001, but refused to pay the fee in 2002 after 
ceasing active plant operations.”17 Despite closing its plant and refusing to 
pay the annual fee, FMC continued to store hazardous waste on the Res-
ervation.18 
 
III.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 FMC challenged the annual fee in tribal court, producing evidence 
showing the stored waste caused no harm and claiming “the EPA’s con-
tainment program foreclosed any need to impose substantial fees.”19 Con-
versely, the Tribes produced evidence that the stored waste “was severely 
toxic, would remain so for generations, and could not be moved off-site.”20 
The tribal court issued two opinions.21 The first opinion established the 
Tribes had jurisdiction, while the second established the tribal permits 
FMC obtained under the 1998 agreement with the Tribes had not been 
codified in a tribal ordinance, and the Secretary of the Interior had not 
approved the $1.5 million annual fee.22  
The Tribes appealed to the tribal appellate court, which ruled in 
favor of the Tribes, finding they had satisfied the first Montana v. United 
States exception and ordered FMC to pay the $1.5 million annual fee.23  
 
11.  FMC Corp. I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *7. 
12.  Id. at *8. 
13.  Id. at *9. 
14.  Id. 
15.  Id. at *3. 
16.  Id. 
17.  FMC Corp. II, 942 F.3d at 919. 
18.  Id. 
19.  FMC Corp. I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *3. 
20.  Id. 
21.  Id. at *13. 
22.  Id. 
23.  Id. at *13, *16 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–
66 (1981) (stating a tribe may establish civil jurisdiction over non-Indians if either the 
non-Indian consents to tribal jurisdiction or the non-Indian’s conduct threatens the 
“political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe”)). 
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Three months prior to reaching the decision, but while still delib-
erating the issue, two of the judges from the three-judge tribal appellate 
panel attended a conference at the University of Idaho School of Law.24 
At the conference, the judges criticized many United States Supreme Court 
decisions in federal Indian law and discussed the need to protect tribal 
sovereignty.25 The judges were particularly critical of the Court’s decision 
in Montana v. United States.26 
Nearly a year later, the two judges were removed and replaced for 
unrelated reasons, and FMC filed a motion for the tribal appellate court to 
reconsider its decision.27 The court granted the request for reconsideration 
but affirmed the initial decision.28  Subsequently, FMC challenged the 
tribal court’s jurisdiction in federal district court and claimed the tribal 
appellate court’s bias had violated FMC’s due process rights.29  
The United States District Court for the District of Idaho (“District 
Court”) held that the Tribes had jurisdiction under both exceptions to the 
general presumption against tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians es-
tablished in Montana.30 The District Court found that FMC consented to 
the Tribes’ jurisdiction,31 and “the record show[ed] conclusively that a 
failure by the EPA to contain the massive amount of highly toxic FMC 
waste would be catastrophic for the health and welfare of the Tribes.”32 
Further, the District Court found “FMC received a full and fair trial before 
an impartial tribal appellate court, and c[ould] find no prejudice there or 
in the Tribes’ laws.”33 
 With respect to the Tribes’ permitting requirement, the District 
Court held that the Tribes properly exercised jurisdiction over FMC under 
Montana’s first and second exceptions. 34  Although the District Court 
found that both Montana exceptions applied, it only extended comity to 
the tribal courts through the first exception,35 finding the Tribes failed to 
establish a relationship between the annual fee and the existential threat 
established under the second Montana exception.36 Notwithstanding the 
Tribes’ improper exercise of jurisdiction under the second Montana ex-
ception as to $1.5 million annual fee, the District Court enforced the tribal 
appellate court’s judgment under the first Montana exception, while also 
holding that the tribal judicial process and the appellate court’s judgment 
 
24. Id. at *14. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at *14–16 (referencing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 
(1981)). 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at *27. 
30. Id. at *27–31. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at *37. 
33.  Id. at *40. 
34.  Id. at *43. 
35.  Id. at *40–42. 
36.  Id. (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981)). 
4             PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW             Vol. 0 
 
did not violate FMC’s due process rights.37 Ultimately, the District Court 
rejected FMC’s motion for declaratory judgment and injunction against 
the tribal court’s judgment.38 
 
IV.  NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION 
 
 FMC appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit (“Ninth Circuit”), arguing the Tribes lacked jurisdiction under both 
Montana exceptions and that FMC was denied due process.39 The Tribes 
filed a cross-appeal claiming “the [D]istrict [C]ourt erred in finding that 
the judgment was not enforceable under the second Montana exception.”40 
 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that “federal courts must recog-
nize and enforce tribal court judgments under principles of comity,” which 
in turn require the tribal court to have both personal and subject matter 
jurisdiction over the defendant and to ensure due process.41 Thus, if the 
Tribes lacked regulatory jurisdiction, adjudicatory jurisdiction, or denied 
FMC due process “because two judges of the Tribal Court of Appeals were 
biased against it,” the Ninth Circuit reasoned the Tribal Appellate Court’s 
decision would not be entitled to recognition under comity.42 
 
A.  Regulatory Jurisdiction 
 
 FMC is a non-Indian entity whose conduct is on non-Indian fee 
land within the boundaries of the Reservation.43 For this reason, the Ninth 
Circuit applied the framework established in Montana.44 Under Montana, 
tribes retain civil regulatory jurisdiction where a non-Indian “enters into 
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commer-
cial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements,” or “the conduct of 
non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation . . . threatens or has some 
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health 
or welfare of the tribe.”45 
 The Supreme Court has recognized that permit requirements and 
permit fees constitute a form of regulation.46 Additionally, nonmembers 
may expressly or implicitly consent to regulation under the first Montana 
exception. 47  Based on these precedents, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
 
37.  Id. at *42–43. 
38.  Id. 
39.  FMC Corp. II, 942 F.3d at 930. 
40.  Id. 
41. Id. at 930 (citing AT&T Corp. v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 295 F.3d 899, 
903 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
42.  Id. at 931. 
43.  Id. 
44.  Id. 
45. 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981). 
46. FMC Corp. II, 942 F.3d at 932. 
47. Plains Commerce. Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 
316, 338 (2008). 
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FMC’s agreement with the Tribes demonstrated both express and implicit 
consent to the Tribes’ jurisdiction.48 While FMC argued the EPA coerced 
its consent to tribal jurisdiction, the court found FMC’s decision consti-
tuted a “business decision” to avoid the costs and hardships of litigation.49 
The Tribes merely took advantage of the bargaining leverage created by 
the EPA and FMC’s negotiations.50 Further, because FMC had an exten-
sive relationship with the Tribes dating back seventy years and a strong 
understanding of the Tribes’ regulatory structure, the Ninth Circuit did not 
find FMC’s objections to a non-Indian being subjected to strange and for-
eign laws compelling.51  
Finally, in a previous dispute between FMC and the Tribes, the 
Ninth Circuit determined the Tribes had regulatory jurisdiction to compel 
FMC to comply with their Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance because 
the two parties had negotiated and entered an agreement based upon the 
Tribes’ ordinances.52 In that case, the Ninth Circuit held the agreement 
constituted a consensual relationship under Montana.53 The court identi-
fied similarities between the facts of the 1990 case and the current case 
and reasoned they should have the same conclusion.54 Therefore, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the Tribes satisfied the first Montana exception.55 
As to the second Montana exception, FMC argued that the record 
did not support tribal jurisdiction and Ninth Circuit precedent barred the 
Tribes from asserting jurisdiction.56 However, upon examining the record, 
the Ninth Circuit identified overwhelming evidence to the contrary. The 
presence of elemental phosphorous in the ground and phosphine gas in the 
air constituted an existential threat to the health, safety, and welfare of the 
Tribes.57 FMC argued the EPA’s CERCLA plan, and FMC’s subsequent 
implementation of that plan, addressed and eliminated the threat of harm 
where elemental phosphorus had contaminated the ground.58 The Ninth 
Circuit noted, however, many areas of the site had not been treated under 
the CERCLA plan, and the EPA admitted the actions taken under the plan 
did not eliminate the threat to the Tribes’ health and welfare.59 First, of 
FMC’s eleven waste ponds⎯the source of the phosphine gas in the 
air⎯FMC only capped nine.60 In 2006 and 2010, the EPA reported that 
the “[h]igh concentrations of phosphine accumulating within the [FMC] 
 
48. FMC Corp. II, 942 F.3d at 932. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51.  Id. at 933–34. 
52. Id. at 934 (citing FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311 
(9th Cir. 1990)). 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55.  Id. 
56. Id. at 939 (citing Evans v. Shoshone-Bannock Land Use Policy 
Comm'n, 736 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 2013)).  
57. Id. at 934–39. 
58. Id. at 936. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
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RCRA ponds . . . being released constitute[d] an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to public health or welfare or the environment within the 
meaning of Section 106(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a),” and a for-
mer EPA official testified that FMC failed to adequately maintain the haz-
ardous sites.61 A former official for the EPA testified that FMC did not 
properly monitor the waste ponds and had not implemented a warning sys-
tem.62 
 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit stated that Evans did not apply to 
this case.63 In Evans, the Tribes failed to establish that the construction of 
a single-family home “threatened or had some direct effect on the political 
integrity, economic security, or the health or welfare of the Tribes.”64 The 
Ninth Circuit, however, differentiated Evans from the current case by not-
ing “the threats from the FMC site . . . are not minimal annoyances. They 
are the threat of catastrophic health reactions, including death.”65 
 Despite the remedial actions taken by FMC, the Ninth Circuit de-
termined the toxic nature of the waste, the incomplete implementation of 
these actions, and the fact that the continued threat of harm persisted even 
where FMC had followed EPA instructions to completion, were all suffi-
cient reasons to establish a threat satisfying the second Montana excep-
tion.66 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that FMC’s site constituted an existen-
tial threat to the health, safety, and welfare of the Tribes.67  
 Having established that both Montana exceptions had been satis-
fied, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether a nexus existed between the sec-
ond Montana exception and the Tribes’ request for damages.68 Reversing 
the District Court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit found “[a] more-than-suf-
ficient nexus may be shown by comparing fees charged on the open market 
for hazardous waste storage [against] the $1.5 million annual fee charged 
by the Tribes . . . .”69 Based on the costs of commercial hazardous waste 
disposers, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the $1.5 million annual fee was 
“an extraordinary bargain” and established “a more-than-sufficient nexus 
between the storage of FMC’s dangerous—potentially catastrophic—
waste and the $1.5 million annual use permit fee to warrant the assessment 
of that fee under Montana’s second exception.”70 
 
 
61. Id. at 939 (internal citations omitted). 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 940. 
64. Id. (quoting Evans v. Shoshone-Bannock Land Use Policy Comm’n, 
736 F.3d 1298, 1303–06 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
65. Id. at 940 (internal citations omitted). 
66. Id. at 934–39. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 940. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 941. 
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B.  Adjudicatory Jurisdiction 
 While Strate v. A1 Contractors established tribes’ adjudicatory ju-
risdiction must not exceed their regulatory jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit 
noted “the Supreme Court has never decided whether a Tribe’s adjudica-
tory jurisdiction is necessarily as extensive as its regulatory jurisdiction.”71 
Citing two of its previous decisions, the Ninth Circuit stated adjudicatory 
and regulatory jurisdiction must be congruent because “[a]ny other con-
clusion would impermissibly interfere with the tribes[’] inherent sover-
eignty, contradict long-standing principles the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly recognized, and conflict with Congress’s interest in promoting tribal 
self-government.”72 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held the Tribes had both reg-
ulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction. 
 
C.  Due Process 
 
 FMC additionally claimed the two judges who served on the three-
judge tribal appellate court panel unfairly favored the Tribes.73 FMC cited 
remarks the judges made at a conference sponsored by the University of 
Idaho College of Law.74  Upon reviewing the statements made by the 
 
71. Id. 
72. Id. (citing Water Wheel Camp Rec. Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 
802, 816 (9th Cir. 2011); accord Knighton v. Cedarville Rancheria of N. Paiute Indi-
ans, 922 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2019)).  
73. Id. at 942 (citing FMC Corp. I., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *15–16.) 
FMC highlighted statements by Judges Gabourie and Pearson. Judge Gabourie offered 
his opinion relating to pollution by companies operating on reservations: 
You know, there's one area, too, there are tribes that have had min-
ing and other operations going on, on the reservation, you know, 
and then the mining company or whatever, manufacturing com-
pany, disappears. They leave, you know. They've — they've either 
dug everything they could, and the then ground is disturbed, some-
times polluted beyond repair. And you sit as a — as an appellate 
court justice, and you're starting to read the cases that come down 
from the tribal court. And you're saying to yourself, you know, We 
know that the — there's pollution, that the food that they're eating 
is polluted, the water's polluted, but nobody proved it. And while 
John Jones said that it is polluted, you know, John Jones don't count. 
But the tribal courts have got to realize that you need expert wit-
nesses. You need chemists and whatever to get out of testifying. It 
may cost a little, but so the appellate court is in a position of re-
manding that case back and say "do it." 
Judge Pearson added: 
If you're a law student and you're going to practice law, as well as 
if you're a judge and you're going to be hearing cases, you know 
where — companies come on the reservations and do business for 
X number of years and they dirty up your groundwater and your 
other things, and they go out of business. And they leave you just 
sitting. And you need to know what you can do as you're sitting as 
a judge with those cases coming toward you. 
74. Id. 
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judges, the Ninth Circuit determined that neither judge had made “any 
statements at the conference indicating bias against FMC.”75 To the con-
trary, a recording of the judges’ speeches revealed that they emphasized 
the need for impartiality.76 While the judges criticized Supreme Court de-
cisions, the Ninth Circuit concluded that their opinions did not indicate or 
rise to a level of bias.77 Most importantly, the Ninth Circuit remarked that 
the repaneling of the tribal appellate court and reconsideration of the pre-
vious panel’s decision obviated this argument.78 
 Finally, FMC argued that tribal courts inherently risk nonmember 
due process.79 However, the Supreme Court, Ninth Circuit, and other cir-
cuit courts have consistently rejected such arguments.80 Based on these 
precedents and its own experience, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “con-
trary to the contention of FMC, tribal courts do not treat nonmembers un-
fairly.”81 
 Because the Tribes had both regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion—and because FMC was not denied due process—the Ninth Circuit 
recognized and upheld the tribal appellate court’s decision under the prin-
ciple of comity. 82  Further, the Ninth Circuit held the tribal appellate 
court’s judgment enforceable under both Montana exceptions.83 
 
V.  CASE ANALYSIS 
 
 This case represents the quintessential scenario of a tribe seeking 
to assert civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian’s conduct on non-Indian fee 
land within the bounds of its reservation. The severity and extremity of the 
circumstances, however, highlight federal courts’ reluctance to recognize 
tribal civil jurisdiction. To fully understand the potential impacts of this 
case, one must first understand the precedential history of the Montana 
line of cases.  
 
A.  Precedential History 
 
 As noted by the Ninth Circuit in this case, biases within tribal 
courts arising from the cultural divide between Indians and non-Indians 
 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 943. 
80. Id. (internal citations omitted).  
81. Id. at 944 (stating “[T]ribal courts often provide litigants with due 
process that ‘exceed[s] the protections offered by state and federal courts” and empir-
ical studies “demonstrate that tribal courts are even-handed in dispensing justice to 
nonmembers.”  (citing Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 
862 F.3d 1236, 1250 (10th Cir. 2017); Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: 
Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047, 1051 
(2005)). 
82.  Id. 
83.  Id. at 931, 941. 
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remains a concern among many people and entities.84 In the nineteenth 
century, the Supreme Court not only recognized tribal court decisions but 
also found that that tribes’ cultural distinctions were “an additional reason 
not to construe a vague treaty provision to repeal a statute clearly prohib-
iting such jurisdiction.”85 However, in the twentieth century, the Supreme 
Court reduced the recognition of tribal jurisdiction within Indian Country. 
In 1978, the Supreme Court found “that these considerations spoke 
‘equally strongly against the . . . contention that Indian tribes . . . retain the 
power to try non-Indians according to their own customs and proce-
dure.’”86 Suquamish v. Oliphant87 established that this cultural divide was 
“sufficient to remove all tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.”88 
Despite finding that tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, 
the Supreme Court held that tribes retain criminal jurisdiction over their 
members in United States v. Wheeler, and that the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution did not 
apply to tribal government actions concerning tribal members in Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez. 89  Thus, Wheeler and Santa Clara Pueblo 
demonstrate a divergence between tribal authority over Indians and non-
Indians.90 
 Oliphant addressed the extent of criminal, rather than civil, tribal 
jurisdiction.91 In 1980, the Supreme Court first addressed tribal authority 
to assert civil regulatory jurisdiction authority over non-Indians when it 
found the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation had the regula-
tory jurisdiction to impose a tax on cigarettes purchased by non-Indians.92 
Oliphant’s true impact on tribal civil jurisdiction was not revealed until 
1981 in Montana v. United States, when the Court handed down one of its 
greatest curtailments of tribal civil jurisdiction.93 Drawing on Oliphant, 
the Court held that “[t]hough Oliphant only determined inherent tribal au-
thority in criminal matters, the principles on which it relied support the 
general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe 
do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”94  
Despite this curtailment, the Montana Court emphasized that, 
“[t]o be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise 
some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, 
 
84.  Id. at 943. 
85.  Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Non-
members in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047, 1057 (2005). 
86. Id. (quoting Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211 
(1978)). 
87.  435 U.S. 191, 211 (1978). 
88. Berger, supra note 85, at 1058. 
89. Id. (referencing 435 U.S. 313 (1978) and 436 U.S. 49 (1978)). 
90. Id. 
91. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191. 
92. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 
447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
93.  450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981). 
94. Id. at 565. 
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even on non-Indian fee lands.”95 Thus, the Supreme Court held that tribes 
lack civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians on non-Indian fee land 
unless: (1) the non-Indian “enter[ed into] consensual relationships with the 
tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or 
other arrangements” or (2) “the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within 
its reservation . . . threatens or has some direct effect on the political in-
tegrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”96 Ad-
ditionally, the Montana court stated that if Congress wished to extend 
tribal jurisdiction to lands owned by non-Indians, it can do so “by incor-
porating . . . the definition of ‘Indian country’ in 18 U.S.C. § 1151.”97 
 The cases immediately following Montana deviated from that de-
cision in their support of tribal jurisdiction. 98  In Merrion v. Jicarilla 
Apache, the Supreme Court held that tribes have the authority to tax non-
Indians for oil and gas revenues from severed land under their “general 
authority, as sovereign[s], to control economic activity within [their] ju-
risdiction, and to defray the cost of providing governmental services by 
requiring contributions from persons or enterprises engaged in economic 
activities within that jurisdiction.”99 However, the sentiment reflected in 
Montana reemerged in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the 
Yakima.100 In Brendale, the Yakima attempted to assert civil regulatory 
jurisdiction over two parcels of land, and the Court examined the land-
status to determine whether the Yakima had jurisdiction.101 The first parcel 
was in an “open area” on the fringe of the reservation surrounded by a 
significantly large non-Indian population, while the second parcel was in 
a “closed area” in an undeveloped location at the heart of the reserva-
tion.102 By examining the characteristics of the parcels, a plurality of jus-
tices found that the Yakima had jurisdiction over the parcel within the 
“closed area” of the reservation but not over the parcel within the “open 
area” of the reservation.103 Thus, Brendale established a tribe can exert 
civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indian activity on fee land if the par-
cel is in a “closed area” of the reservation.104 Further, Brendale established 
a tribe’s ability to zone land within its reservation was essential to prevent 
 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 565–66 (internal citations omitted). 
97. Id. at 562. “Indian Country” means “all land within the limits of any 
Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwith-
standing the issuance of any patent, and including rights-of-way running through the 
reservation.” 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2018). 
98. Berger, supra note 85, at 1060.   
99. 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982). 
100. Berger, supra note 85, at 1060–61; see 492 U.S. 408 (1989). 
101. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima, 492 U.S. 
408, 417 (1989). 
102. Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 617 F. Supp. 735, 752 (E.D. 
Wash. 1985) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); Brendale, 492 U.S. 408, 
417 (1989). 
103. Berger, supra note 85, at 1061. 
104. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 432. 
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demonstrably serious harm and to prevent the imperilment of its political 
integrity, the economic security, or health and welfare.105 
 Despite this brief stint of decisions favorable to tribes, nearly a 
decade later the Supreme Court narrowed the Montana exceptions.106 In 
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the Court ruled if the second Montana exception 
only required non-Indian conduct to “jeopardize the safety of tribal mem-
bers,” then “the exception would severely shrink the rule.”107 Thus, the 
Court concluded that tribes must demonstrate that tribal civil jurisdiction 
“is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal rela-
tions.”108 
 Similarly, in Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, the Court dismissed 
the assertion under Jicarilla Apache that tribes had the authority to tax 
economic activity on Indian lands.109 Using similar language as Strate, the 
Atkinson Court asserted that the exception in Jicarilla Apache would 
“swallow the rule.”110 Instead, the Atkinson Court ruled that for the first 
Montana exception to apply, “the tax or regulation imposed by the Indian 
tribe [must] have a nexus to the consensual relationship itself,” reasoning 
consent in one circumstance did not constitute consent in all circum-
stances.111 
 In 2004, the Court once again diminished tribal civil regulatory 
jurisdiction, specifically on tribal trust land.112 In Nevada v. Hicks, the 
Court held the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes lacked civil adjudicatory ju-
risdiction for a tribal member’s claim against a state officer for conduct on 
tribal trust land.113 Read broadly, Hicks could indicate that tribes generally 
lack civil jurisdiction over non-Indians within Indian Country regardless 
of land status.114 However, Justice Scalia stated this holding “is limited to 
the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state 
law.”115 Thus, the Court “[left] open the question of tribal-court jurisdic-
tion over nonmember defendants in general.”116 
The question of whether tribes may exercise adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion over nonmember defendants remains undecided, despite being con-
sidered again by the Supreme Court in Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi 
Band of Choctaw Indians, where the Court was evenly divided.117 In that 
case, Dollar General entered a lease agreement with the Mississippi Band 
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of Choctaw Indians to build a store on trust land.118 While the Fifth Circuit 
declined to declare whether the first Montana exception required a con-
sensual relationship to be commercial, the Fifth Circuit found that Dollar 
General’s hiring of a minor as an intern under a tribal youth employment 
program constituted “unquestionably a relationship "of a commercial na-
ture.”119 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit found a nexus between the youth 
employment program and Dollar General’s tortious actions.120 Thus, the 
Fifth Circuit held that tribes may exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians on 
tribal trust land.121 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the 
Fifth Circuit.122 However, this decision offers no insight or guidance in 
determining to what extent tribes have civil jurisdiction over non-Indians 
in Indian Country because the Supreme Court could not reach a majority 
decision.123 Rather, the Supreme Court’s per curiam decision merely af-
firmed the Fifth Circuit’s judgment.124 
 Finally, in 2008, under Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family 
Land & Cattle Co., the Supreme Court collapsed the two Montana excep-
tions into one, noting that “Montana expressly limits its first exception to 
the ‘activities of nonmembers,’ . . . allowing these to be regulated to the 
extent necessary ‘to protect tribal self-government [and] to control internal 
relations . . . .’”125 Further, Plains Commerce required under the second 
Montana exception that the non-Indian conduct be “catastrophic” for tribal 
self-government.126  
 Thus, over the course of three decades, the Supreme Court has 
greatly reduced tribal jurisdiction. Tribal jurisdiction has eroded from rec-
ognizing jurisdiction to a general presumption against tribal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians on non-Indian fee land,127 unless the tribe can establish 
that the activities of the non-Indians pose a “catastrophic” threat to tribal 
self-governance. 128  The Supreme Court’s consistent whittling away at 
tribal civil jurisdiction demonstrates a troubling trend for tribes in federal 
Indian law. However, as Justice Scalia noted, “the question of tribal-court 
jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general” remains.129 
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B.  The Ninth Circuit’s Montana Analysis 
 
 Given the recent trend regarding tribal civil jurisdiction, not only 
did the Ninth Circuit reach the proper legal conclusion in FMC Corp. v. 
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, but the decision also represents a welcome res-
pite for tribes. Since 1978, the Supreme Court has consistently moved the 
goal posts, making the standard for establishing tribal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians increasingly stringent.130 Given the precedential context of 
the case, and the facts and circumstances from which the case arises, the 
Ninth Circuit could have come to no other conclusion without seriously 
calling into question tribal civil jurisdiction under the Montana line of 
cases. 
 
1.  Consensual Relationship 
 
 As established in Montana, the Tribes overcame the presumption 
that they do not have civil regulatory or adjudicatory jurisdiction over 
FMC by establishing a consensual relationship.131 Based on the record and 
the requirements set by Montana, Atkinson, and Plains Commerce, a find-
ing other than a consensual relationship here would have been illogical.  
 Atkinson requires that consensual relationships have a nexus with 
the conduct that the Tribe seeks to regulate.132 The Tribes and FMC nego-
tiated an agreement where FMC acquiesced to submit to tribal jurisdiction 
and pay an annual fee of $1.5 million in exchange for tribal permitting.133 
The permitting directly addressed FMC’s disposal of the plant’s hazardous 
materials.134 FMC entered this agreement specifically to satisfy its obliga-
tion to submit to tribal permitting under its agreement with the EPA, and 
the Tribes sought to regulate FMC’s storage of hazardous waste.135 Be-
cause the consensual relationship existed for the express purpose of FMC 
submitting to Tribal permitting, a nexus sufficient to satisfy Atkinson ex-
isted between the consensual relationship and FMC’s conduct. 
Plains Commerce states that where a non-Indian “should have rea-
sonably anticipated that [its] interactions might ‘trigger’ tribal authority,” 
the first Montana exception is met.136 Plains Commerce further requires 
the Tribes to show that FMC’s consensual relationship relates to conduct 
that is “catastrophic” for tribal self-government.137 To complete the terms 
of the consent decree with the EPA regarding hazardous waste disposal, 
FMC consented to tribal civil jurisdiction.138 The Ninth Circuit agreed 
with the District Court that the agreement constituted a “sweetheart deal” 
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favoring FMC.139 FMC “desperately grasped” at the agreement to avoid 
litigation with the EPA, reduce permitting fees from the Tribes, and con-
tinuing to store the hazardous waste on site.140  
Thus, it is reasonable to anticipate that tribal authority would be 
triggered where a non-Indian entity has negotiated an agreement to pay a 
lower fee in exchange for submitting to a tribal permitting process. Such 
terms leave no room for argument without altering the parameters of Mon-
tana. FMC attempted to side-step this issue by claiming the EPA coerced 
it into submitting to tribal jurisdiction.141 However, FMC had recourse 
other than to negotiate a permitting agreement with the Tribes.142 While 
the negotiations produced a potentially more favorable outcome than liti-
gating with the EPA, FMC had the power to negotiate its relationship with 
the Tribes.143 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded that a con-
sensual relationship existed under Montana, Atkinson, and Plains Com-
merce. 
 
2.  Harm Catastrophic for Tribal Self-Governance 
 
 To satisfy the Montana test under Plains Commerce, FMC’s stor-
age of elemental phosphorous in the ground and the waste pools must pose 
a catastrophic threat to the Tribes’ self-governance.144 The EPA concluded 
that the elemental phosphorus at the FMC site constitutes a “principal 
threat waste,” meaning the waste is “highly toxic or highly mobile that 
generally cannot be reliably contained or would present a significant risk 
to human health or the environment should exposure occur.”145 Further, 
the EPA’s CERCLA plan called for the capping of all contaminated ar-
eas.146 Not only did FMC fail to cap all contaminated areas, the EPA con-
ceded that even if FMC had done so, the measure would still “present a 
threat to [t]ribal health and welfare.”147 
 Additionally, phosphine gas “is ‘very flammable,’ ‘highly reac-
tive,’ and ‘extremely toxic’ to humans.”148 The gas is stored in waste 
ponds, all but two of which have been capped.149 After two inspections, 
the EPA found that FMC failed to properly maintain the ponds, which 
 
139. FMC Corp. II, 942 F.3d at 933. 
140. Id. 
141. FMC Corp. II, 942 F.3d at 934. 
142. Id. at 921–23; FMC Corp. I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *5–9. 
143. FMC Corp. II, 942 F.3d at 921–23; FMC Corp. I, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS at *5. 
144. 554 U.S. 316, 341 (2008). 
145. FMC Corp. II, 942 F.3d at 936. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 936–37. 
2020       FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES        15 
 
continued to leak gas, “constitut[ing] an imminent and substantial endan-
germent to public health or welfare or the environment.”150 Thus, the na-
ture and state of the phosphorus and phosphine gas are such a threat that 
catastrophe would follow any failed containment of either, while the re-
medial measures taken by FMC do not guarantee the safety of the Tribes,  
and FMC’s implementation of said measures leaves much to be desired.151 
Further, the nature of both the phosphorus and phosphine gas are such that 
a failed containment would have effects beyond the plant site itself and 
across the Reservation.152  
Due to the catastrophic threat posed by the hazardous waste on 
FMC’s site, the second Montana exception has clearly been satisfied. An 
opposite finding would be nonsensical in light of the toxicity and volatility 
of the substance and the uncertainty and poor execution surrounding 
FMC’s remedial measures. Unlike Plains Commerce, Montana, and Strate, 
the harm threatened in this case has the potential to cause serious injury or 
death across the Reservation.153 Both the EPA and a witness for the Tribes 
described the phosphine gas as a “close cousin to the phosgene gas used 
in World War I” to kill soldiers and, therefore, “acutely and chronically 
dangerous to people in the area or downstream . . . or downwind.”154 A 
2010 EPA report highlights the severity of the threat with findings that the 
gas emitted from one of the waste ponds presented an urgent public health 
hazard.155 Additionally, the waste is exceptionally volatile and combus-
tible when exposed to air.156 One witness explained the volatility of ele-
mental phosphorus, testifying to seeing ducks spontaneously ignite as they 
attempted to fly off after having landed in waste pond.157 The ducks and 
EPA report represent just two of several specific threats to the Tribes; 
however, they highlight the severity of the circumstances.158 
By contrast, Plains Commerce concerned the sale of formerly In-
dian-owned fee land to a third party,159 Strate concerned a car crash,160 and 
Montana concerned hunting and fishing regulations.161 The extreme cir-
cumstances in this case represent a threat of harm far greater than the harm 
threatened in those cases. This case, therefore, is more akin to Brendale. 
In Brendale, the Supreme Court held tribes retain inherent authority to 
regulate non-Indian conduct that is “demonstrably serious and must im-
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peril the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and wel-
fare of the tribe.”162 The Brendale Court determined that refusing to com-
ply with tribal zoning ordinances imperiled the political integrity of the 
tribe. Here, FMC sought to avoid compliance with tribal permitting for 
storage of hazardous waste. If anything, FMC’s conduct presented a far 
greater threat to political integrity due to the severity of potential harm. 
As the exception is defined under Plains Commerce, Strate, and 
Brendale, FMC’s conduct satisfies the second Montana exception. Any 
other finding would obviate the exception. If a court found the storage of 
hazardous material with the potential to severely injure or kill anyone 
downwind or downstream of the facility in the event of a leak did not qual-
ify as “catastrophic,” how much greater would a threat of harm have to be 
to satisfy the second Montana exception? A ruling for FMC here would 
call into question the ability of a tribe to assert civil jurisdiction over non-
Indian conduct within a reservation—ever. 
 
3.  En Banc Petition 
 
 On November 29, 2019, FMC filed a petition for rehearing en 
banc,163 which the Ninth Circuit denied.164 FMC argued that the Ninth Cir-
cuit misinterpreted Montana by disregarding its limitations and enlarging 
both the first and second exceptions.165 
First, FMC argued that the Tribes failed to demonstrate the annual 
fee of $1.5 million was necessary to tribal government.166 However, as 
noted in the Ninth Circuit opinion, the annual fee was necessary to conduct 
the governmental services required to oversee the permitting process.167  
Second, FMC argued the Ninth Circuit enlarged the two Montana 
exceptions.168 In its petition, FMC alleged the first exception only applies 
where tribes have entered into commercial relationships with non-Indian 
entities and that the second exception cannot be satisfied by a “highly 
speculative threat.”169 FMC argued that the establishment of a consensual 
relationship was an exercise of tribal authority and therefore did not qual-
ify under the first exception.170 Additionally, FMC claimed its relationship 
fell outside the first Montana exception because it could not terminate the 
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consensual relationship.171 However, FMC only entered into this relation-
ship at the direction of the EPA.172 Additionally, FMC took advantage of 
a “sweetheart deal” that it could have declined.173  
Finally, FMC argued that the Ninth Circuit improperly substituted 
speculative harm for actual harm under the second Montana exception, 
stating that the Tribes were not under actual threat because of the preven-
tative measures implemented under their EPA-approved plan.174 Citing 
Evans, FMC alleged that the court’s decision only allowed the Tribes to 
assert jurisdiction where necessary to “avert catastrophe.”175 However, the 
EPA testified that the protective measures under FMC’s plan were not 
fully implemented, had flaws, and were not sufficient to eliminate the 
threat.176 Additionally, the type of harm here is much greater than the 
“minimal annoyances” in Evans.177  
Ultimately, FMC’s arguments in its petition for rehearing were 
incorrect and unpersuasive. The court correctly applied Montana in this 
case and properly determined the Tribes had civil jurisdiction over FMC. 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit properly denied FMC’s petition. 
 
VII.  FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 
 
 Despite the Ninth Circuit’s conclusions, this case may not be set-
tled. On March 16, 2020, FMC filed a petition for writ of certiorari,178 
reasserting that the Tribes lacked civil jurisdiction.179 Similar to its petition 
for rehearing en banc, FMC argues the Ninth Circuit has misinterpreted 
and incorrectly enlarged the Montana exceptions.180 In the petition, FMC 
calls several Ninth Circuit decisions into question, including Water Wheel 
and Window Rock Unified School District v. Reeves.181  
In the interim, the Ninth Circuit has agreed to stay the issuance of 
its mandate. FMC, although blaming the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, 
notes the uncertainty surrounding Montana and the question of tribal civil 
jurisdiction. 182  This assertion echoes Justice Scalia’s questioning of 
whether Tribes may exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians is still an open 
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question.183 This case may soon provide insight into that question and oth-
ers left unanswered by both Hicks and Dollar General. 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
 FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes provides a strong example of 
the perils of tribal civil jurisdiction and the reluctance to extend recogni-
tion of tribal court authority. While its precedential history is fraught with 
cases that have chipped away at what was once an inherent power of tribes 
as sovereign nations, the Ninth Circuit’s decision is rightfully favorable to 
tribal civil jurisdiction, even though the Supreme Court has consistently 
restricted that authority over the last forty years. However, as is often the 
case in federal Indian law, circuit court decisions, no matter how properly 
reasoned or supported by precedent, are frequently overturned by the Su-
preme Court. 
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